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Abstract
Traditional adaptive steganography is a technique used for covert communication with high security, but the scheme is invalid in
the case of stego image is damaged by lossy channels, such as JPEG compression of channels. To deal with such problem, robust
adaptive steganography is proposed to enable the receiver to extract the secret message from the damaged stego image. Previous
works utilise reverse engineering and compression-resistant domain constructing to implement robust adaptive steganography. In
this paper, we adopt modification with re-compression in embedding scheme to improve the robustness of stego sequences. To
balance security and robustness, we move the embedding domain to the low frequency region to improve the security of robust
adaptive steganography. In addition, we add an additional check code to further reduce the average extraction error rate based
on the framework of E-DMAS (Enhancing Dither Modulation based robust Adaptive Steganography). Compared with GMAS
(Generalized dither Modulation based robust Adaptive Steganography) and E-DMAS, Experiments show that our scheme can
achieve strong robustness and improve the security of robust adaptive steganography greatly when the channel quality factor is
known.
Keywords: Robust steganography, Lossy channel, Robustness, Security
1. Introduction
Steganography is a science and technology to embedding
secret messages in images by slightly modifying the pixel val-
ues (in spatial domain) or DCT coefficients (in JPEG domain)
of normal images [1]. Nowadays, the most popular steganog-
raphy method is adaptive steganography scheme, which defines
a distortion function to calculate modification costs of all el-
ements, then embedding secret messages into cover elements
with Syndrome-Trellis Codes (STCs) [2] and the corresponding
costs. Such as J-UNIWARD [3], UERD [4] in JPEG domain.
The schemes [3, 4] are only suitable for laboratory environ-
ment which assumes the receiver can receive the stego image
losslessly. However, social network will execute lossy process,
such as JPEG compression and resize, on the uploaded images
because of limited storage and bandwidth. The stego image will
be damaged by lossy process when it is uploaded to social net-
work. It is hard for the receiver to extract the secret message
from the damaged stego image completely. In order to apply
steganography to real life, it is necessary to improve the robust-
ness of adaptive steganography scheme.
Currently, several studies tried to achieve robust adaptive
steganography. In GMAS [5], the robust adaptive steganogra-
phy is divided into three categories according to the application:
1) Upward Robust, 2) Downward Robust, 3) Matching Robust.
Upward Robust is the scheme work in the quality factor of
channel JPEG compression is not smaller than the quality fac-
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tor of cover images. In this mode, Zhang et al. proposed a
structure of Compression-resistant Domain Constructing + RS-
STCs Codes [6]. Based on the framework, Zhang et al. pro-
posed several works such as DCRAS (DCT Coefficients Re-
lationship based Adaptive Steganography ) [7], FRAS (Fea-
ture Region based Adaptive Steganography) [8], DMAS (Dither
Modulation-based robust Adaptive Steganography) [9]. DCRAS
[7] utilizes the robustness of the relationship between DCT co-
efficients to embed information. FRAS [8] obtains robust em-
bedding regions based on feature region extraction and selec-
tion algorithm. DMAS [9] modify middle frequency DCT co-
efficients based on dither modulation algorithm to embed secret
message. Although these schemes [7–9] can achieve a high ex-
traction accuracy, but weak security of the schemes is a serious
disadvantage. Yu et al. proposed GMAS [5] based on DMAS
[9]. They replace symmetric distortion with asymmetric distor-
tion, combined with ternary STCs and expand the embedding
domain to the lower frequency region. GMAS [5] can achieve
strong robustness, especially when the channel quality factor
Qc is known, they select images with quality factor Qc as cover
images can achieve better performance. However, GMAS [5]
adopt the method of encoding secret message with RS codes,
which means with the increase of payload, the security will
decline rapidly because of the large number of check codes.
These schemes [5, 7–9] embed message with STC [2], but er-
rors in stego sequence caused by damaged stego image will ap-
pear error diffusion phenomenon in the STCs decoding [10, 11].
Based on these research, Zhang et al. proposed a new frame-
work Compression-resistant Domain Constructing + STCCRC
Codes [12], which adopt CRC codes [13] to encode the stego
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sequence for less check code. Zhang et al. modify DMAS [9]
with the framework and get a scheme called E-DMAS. The
scheme can achieve higher security than DMAS at high pay-
loads. E-DMAS [12] can solve the problem of rapid decreasing
in security caused by embedding a large number of check codes.
But, the same problem as DMAS [9], secret message is embed-
ded into middle frequency DCT coefficients, security is still an
issue, although better than DMAS [9].
Downward Robust is the scheme work in the quality fac-
tor of channel JPEG compression is smaller than the quality
factor of cover images. Tao et al. proposed a robust steganogra-
phy scheme for the situation in [14]. At first, they re-compress
an original image with channel quality factor and get a cover
image, then they embed a secret message into the cover im-
age with J-UNIWARD [3] or UERD [4] to get a stego image.
The next, they modify DCT coefficients of the original image
according to the stego image and get an intermediate image, so
that the intermediate image is re-compressed with channel qual-
ity factor to obtain the stego image. The scheme can extract the
secret message from the stego image completely and achieve
high security after channel JPEG compression. But the DCT
coefficients residual of the intermediate image and the original
image are too large to guarantee security. In [15], Zhu et al. uti-
lize the robustness of DCT coefficient sign to implement robust
steganography.
Matching Robust is the scheme which re-compress cover
images multiple times to reduce impact of social network. In
[16], Zhao et al. proposed a robust steganography scheme based
on transport channel matching. They re-compress the cover im-
age multiple times with the channel quality factor before em-
bedding a secret message. They encode the secret messag with
BCH code [17] to improve the extraction accuracy of the secret
message. The scheme can achieve strong robustness and high
security. Besides, the capacity of the scheme is large. But it is
suspicious behavior and time-consuming.
Based on the framework proposed in [12], we mitigate the
security shortcomings of GMAS [5] and E-DMAS [12]. We
adopt modification with re-compression to improve the accu-
racy of extracted stego sequence (robustness), which provide
possibility to move the embedding domain to lower frequency
region and pursue trade-off between robustness and security.
The experimental results show that the proposed scheme can
achieve same (or stronger) robustness and higher security (es-
pecially under higher payloads) than GMAS [5] and E-DMAS
[12] when the channel JPEG compression quality factor is uti-
lized. CCPEV (Typical Cartesian Calibrated PEV) [18] and
DCTR (Discrete Cosine Transform Residual) [19] steganaly-
sis algorithms are used to extract steganalysis features of stego
images under different payloads.
The main contributions of this paper are listed as fellow:
(1) Combining with the known channel compression quality
factor, we propose a modification with re-compression based
on the framework proposed in [12] to reduce errors in the ex-
tracted stego sequence.
(2) We balance robustness and security by move embedding do-
main to lower frequency regions to improve security.
In the next section of this paper, we will introduce related
works in Section 2. The proposed method will be introduced
in Section 3. The experiment results are shown in Section 4.
Conclusion is listed in Section 5.
2. Relate works
In this part, the basic idea of dither modulation algorithm,
GMAS algorithm [5] and E-DMAS algorithm [12] are intro-
duced. For more detailed information, refer to the correspond-
ing papers. For convenience, we represent embedding domains
with corresponding symbols in this part.
2.1. Notations
In this paper, all matrices and vectors are represented in
bold. X = (xi j)n1×n2 ,Y = (yi j)n1×n2 represent cover image and
stego image with size n1 × n2 respectively. All cover and stego
images in this paper are JPEG images. The symbol J−1(X) rep-
resent the image that X is decompressed to spatial domain.
2.2. Representation of embedding domain
Figure 1: Embedding domain and symbols
We represent different embedding domains in 8 × 8 DCT
coefficient block with different symbols, for example, E8 repre-
sent the 8 DCT coefficients in counter-diagonal with the same
color as shown in Fig.1. And related embedding domain will be
represented as E number1+number2; for example, E 78 repre-
sent combination of E7 and E8.
2.3. Dither modulation
Dither modulation is an implementation of Quantization In-
dex Modulation (QIM)[20, 21] watermarking scheme which is
a typical digital watermark embedding scheme.
Just as shown in Fig.2, according to the quantization step
q, the coordinate axis is divided into multiple intervals. In the
dither modulation algorithm, if a de-quantized DCT coefficient
value on coordinate axis belong to an odd interval, which repre-
sents cover element 1, otherwise represent 0. Embed message
1 into a de-quantized DCT coefficient which belong to an even
interval, the de-quantized DCT coefficient will be modified to
middle coordinate of the nearest odd interval, just like point p1
2
Figure 2: Embedding scheme of dither modulation algorithm
and modification distance is d1 in Fig.2. It is similar when it
embeds 0 into a de-quantized DCT coefficient belong to odd
interval.
In the generalized dither modulation algorithm proposed in
GMAS[5], cover elements are quantized DCT coefficient val-
ues. When it embeds message 1 into a de-quantized DCT coef-
ficient which belong to an even interval, the de-quantized DCT
coefficient can be modified to middle coordinate of the two
nearest odd intervals just like point p1 and modification dis-
tances are d1 and d2 in Fig.2. It is similar when it embeds 0
into a de-quantized DCT coefficient belong to an odd interval.
2.4. Review of GMAS
Yu et al. propose GMAS [5] with the improved embed-
ding method and embedding region based on DMAS [9]. They
achieve a wonderful trade-off between robustness and security
base on the framework proposed in [6]. The basic idea of GMAS
will be introduced briefly as fellow.
1. For a given cover image X, calculate the de-quantized DCT
coefficients of the cover image.
2. Calculate embedding distortion ρ of each cover element with
distortion function (e.g. J-UNIWARD) according to Eq.1.
ρi j =
3∑
k=1
n1∑
µ=1
n2∑
ν=1
|W (k)µν (J−1(X)) −W (k)µν (J−1(Yxi j ))|
|W (k)µν (J−1(X))| + σ
(1)
3. Calculate asymmetric distortion ρ+, ρ− according to Eq.2
and Eq.3. xi j represent the de-quantized DCT coefficients of
processed image, α ∈ [0, 1].
ρ+i j =
 α · ρi j, xi j <
xi j
qi j
ρi j, xi j ≥ xi jqi j
(2)
ρ−i j =
 α · ρi j, xi j >
xi j
qi j
ρi j, xi j ≤ xi jqi j
(3)
4. Extract cover sequence C and the modification distances d+,
d− from embedding domain with generalized dither modulation
algorithm. Embedding domain adopted by GMAS is E 678 as
shown in Fig.1.
5. Calculate modifying costs ξ+, ξ− with modification distances
d+, d− and asymmetric distortion ρ+, ρ− according to Eq.4 and
Eq.5. qi j is quantization step.
ζ+i j =
ρ+i j
qi j
, ξ+i j = ζ
+
i j × d+i j (4)
ζ−i j =
ρ−i j
qi j
, ξ−i j = ζ
−
i j × d−i j (5)
6. Encode the massage mwith RS codes to get a encoded mas-
sage m′.
7. Embed the encoded message m′ into cover sequence C with
ternary STCs and modifying costs ξ+, ξ− to get a stego image
Y.
The receiver uses the same quantization table to calculate
the quantized DCT coefficients, then utilize STCs decode the
stego sequence after received the stego image, and then extract
secret message with RS decoding.
2.5. Review of E-DMAS
Zhang et al. proposed a new framework of robust steganog-
raphy in [12]. The basic structure is Compression-resistant Do-
main Constructing + STCCRC Codes, which requires cover
sequence is robust. Because CRC code [13] has limited error
correction capability. Besides, the length of the check code is
related to the length of the cover sequence, with the length of
the check code increases, the probability of being detected by
the steganalysis algorithms increases, therefore, the length of
the cover sequence should not be too long. The basic idea of
E-DMAS will be introduced briefly as fellow:
1. For a given cover image X, calculate the de-quantized DCT
coefficients of the cover image.
2. Calculate embedding distortion ρ of each cover element with
distortion functions (e.g. J-UNIWARD) according to Eq.1.
3. Extract cover sequence C and corresponding modification
distances d from embedding domain according to dither mod-
ulation algorithm. Embedding domain adopted by E-DMAS is
E 78 as shown in Fig.1.
4. Calculate modification costs ξ with modification distances
d and distortion ρ according to Eq.6. qi j is the corresponding
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Figure 3: Average number of errors in embedded modified position and non-modified position in damaged stego sequence
quantization step
ζi j =
ρi j
qi j
, ξi j = ζi j × di j (6)
5. Scramble the cover sequence C and modification costs ξ to
get scrambled cover sequence C′ and scrambled modification
costs ξ′, embed secret messages m into first le bits of the scram-
bled cover sequence C′ with STCs and obtain a stego sequence
S1. le can be calculated with Eq.7, lc represent the length of the
cover sequence, lr represent the length of the secret message
in each group CRC codes, k is the highest power of generator
polynomial.
le = lc − d lclr e · k (7)
6. Encode stego sequence S1 with CRC codes [13] and the
check code is embedded into the rest lc− le bits scrambled cover
sequence and obtain a stego sequence S2. Then, we can get a
stego sequence S which is composed of S1 and S2.
7. Inverse scramble the stego sequence S and get a sequence S′,
modify de-quantized DCT coefficients of the cover image with
the stego sequence S′ and modification distances d. Finally, we
can obtain a stego image Y.
The receiver uses the same de-quantization table to calcu-
late the quantized DCT coefficients, then extract the stego se-
quence from de-quantized DCT coefficients with dither modu-
lation. Extract check codes from the last lc − le bits scrambled
stego sequence with STCs decoding to correct the first le bits.
After that, extract secret message from corrected the first le bits
scrambled stego sequence.
3. Proposed method
In this section, we analysis embedding process of GMAS
[5] and E-DMAS [12], and propose ways (modification with re-
compression, lower frequency embedding domain, additional
check code) to improve performance of robust adaptive steganog-
raphy. And pseudo code of our scheme is shown in this section.
3.1. Motivation
In the embedding process of GMAS [5] and E-DMAS [12],
the de-quantized DCT coefficients are keep unchanged when
the corresponding quantized DCT coefficients do not need to
be modified. Some of these unmodified de-quantized DCT co-
efficients may be in an unstable state, they may be change dur-
ing the process of JPEG re-compression because of the round-
ing operation and secret message embedding. To confirm this
viewpoint, we simplify the E-DMAS algorithm on embedding
domain E 2345, we embed the secret message into the cover
sequence to get a stego sequence with dither modulation and
STCs, we modify cover image with the stego sequence to get
stego image. Then we re-compress the stego image with chan-
nel quality factor Qc to simulate channel lossy operation and
extract the damaged stego sequence from the compressed stego
image. Compare the original stego sequence and damaged stego
sequence on 100 images randomly selected from BOSSbase
1.01 [22]. Average number of errors of embedded modified
position and non-modified position in damaged stego sequence
are shown in Fig.3. Obviously, A large number of errors ap-
pear in the DCT coefficients which do not need to be modified,
which shows that our viewpoint is correct.
How to deal with these unstable DCT coefficients is a key
issue. A natural approach is to adjust the unstable DCT co-
efficients in the stego image which called modification with
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Figure 4: Average number of errors in stego sequences of embedding without modification stage and with modification stage
re-compression in this paper. The way to modify the unsta-
ble DCT coefficients adopted in this paper is the dither mod-
ulation algorithm. Modification with re-compression process
will be described in detail in Section 3.2. In order to verify the
performance of this method, compared to simplified E-DMAS,
we add a modification with re-compression process to the em-
bedding stage and generate stego images with two embedding
scheme. Then, we re-compress the stego images with channel
quality factor Qc to simulate channel lossy operation. Next,
we extract damaged stego sequence from the compressed stego
images and calculate average number of errors in the extracted
stego sequences on 100 images randomly selected from BOSS-
base 1.01 [22]. The experimental results are shown in Fig.4.
The modification with re-compression process can reduce the
errors of the stego sequence and improve the robustness.
Traditional adaptive steganography has proved that embed-
ding message on low frequency DCT coefficients is more secu-
rity than high frequency. However, robustness of DCT coeffi-
cients in low frequency region is poor which has been proved in
GMAS [5]. Because of the performance of modification with
re-compression when the quality factor of lossy channel is uti-
lized, it is possible to move the embedding domain to low fre-
quency region to improve security of robust adaptive steganog-
raphy. For better performance, we only consider the lower fre-
quency embedding domain than GMAS [5]. Constructed em-
bedding domain is obtained with experiments in Section 4.3.
In the framework Compression-resistant Domain Construct-
ing + STCCRC Codes [12], check code is embedded into the
rest lc−le bits cover sequence without any error correction code,
it will cause lots of errors in the STCs decoding stage if there
is error in the corresponding stego sequence, because of the er-
ror diffusion phenomenon of STCs. It is reasonable to encode
the rest lc − le bits stego sequence with additional error correc-
tion code. The rationality of the additional check code will be
proved in Section 4.4 with experiments.
It is worth mentioning that current robust adaptive steganog-
raphy is not suitable for embedding with high payload due to
its weak security. Therefore, a smaller embedding domain is
selected to reduce the number of check codes and improve se-
curity of robust steganography.
Besides, considering that CRC codes have limited error cor-
rection capability. We replace CRC codes with RS codes.
The flowchart of our method is shown in Fig.5. First, we
modify the cover image to embed secret message according to
our scheme and obtain a stego image, and then transmit the
stego image to the receiver with a lossy channel. Receiver ex-
tract the secret message from the stego image processed by the
the lossy channel. In the flowchart, the modification phase cor-
responds to modification with re-compression. To facilitate the
explanation, we use pseudo code to introduce the steps of our
embedding scheme.
3.2. Pseudo code of our scheme
In this paper, we assume that the channel quality factor Qc
is known and adopt JPEG images with quality factor Qc as the
cover image.
1. Investigate the quality factor Qc of the lossy channel, and
adopt JPEG images with quality factor Qc as cover images.
2. Calculate distortion ρ of a cover image with typical distor-
tion function (e.g. J-UNIWARD) according to Eq.1.
3. Extract the cover sequence C and corresponding modifica-
tion distances d from the constructed embedding domain with
the dither modulation algorithm.
4. Calculate the modification costs ξ with the modification dis-
tances d and distortion ρ according to Eq.6.
5. Scramble the cover sequence C and modification costs ξ to
get a sequence C′ and modification costs ξ′ in order to avoid
centralized distribution of error points. Sequence C′ is divided
5
Figure 5: Framework of proposed method
into 3 segments(C1,C2,C3, lC1 : lC2 : lC3 ≈ 15 : 3 : 1, lC1
represent the length of C1).
6. Embedding secret messages m into the sequence C1 with
STCs and corresponding distortion to get a stego sequence S1.
7. Encode the stego sequence S1 with RS codes and embed the
check code of S1 into sequence C2 with STCs and correspond-
ing distortion to get a stego sequence S2.
8. Encode the stego sequence S2 with RS codes, embed the
check code of S2 (called additional check code later) into se-
quence C3 with STCs and corresponding distortion to get a
stego sequence S3. Finally, we get a stego sequence S after
inverse scramble the stego sequence (S1,S2,S3).
9. Modify de-quantized DCT coefficients of cover image with
stego sequence S and modification distances d. We generate in-
termediate image I with the modified DCT coefficients.
10. Re-compress the intermediate image I with quality factor
Qc, and extract the stego sequence S′ from re-compressed in-
termediate image I′ with the dither modulation algorithm.
11. Compare S′ with S, if there is difference in S′, we mod-
ify the corresponding de-quantized DCT coefficients in I′ with
dither modulation algorithm.
12. Repeat step 10 and step 11 n times and get a final stego
image Y.
The receiver uses the same quantization table to calculate
the quantized DCT coefficients, then extract the stego sequence
from quantized DCT coefficients with dither modulation algo-
rithm and scramble the stego sequence S. Extract additional
check code from S3 with STCs decoding to correct the S2. Sim-
ilarly, extract check code from corrected S2 with STCs decod-
ing to correct the S1. After that, extract the secret message from
corrected S1 sequence.
4. Experiment
In this part, we obtain the appropriate parameters of our
proposed scheme in section 3 through experiments at first. Then
compare our scheme with GMAS[5] and E-DMAS [12].
4.1. Setups
The dataset of all experiments conducted in this paper is
BOSSbase 1.01[22], which contain 10000 512*512 grayscale
images. We assume that the channel quality factors are Qc =
65, 75. We compress these images with quality factor Qc. We
set the parameter h = 10 of STCs just as GMAS[5] and E-
DMAS[12]. It is worth mentioning that we treat every 8-bit
stego sequence as an integer and encode the integer sequence
with RS (255,251). There is a situation that errors in the stego
sequence exceed the error correction ability of RS codes, it will
not be corrected. And we believe that at most one bit in each
integer is wrong, because of the strong robustness of the cover
sequence. The ensemble classifier [23] is used.
In the following experiment, 1000 images are selected ran-
domly from BOSSbase 1.01 [22] as original images and JPEG
compress these images with quality factor Qc to get cover im-
ages. We embed a secret message into a cover image with the
proposed method to get a stego image, then re-compress the
stego image with the quality factor of lossy channel Qc to sim-
ulate channel lossy operation. We extract the secret message
from the re-compressed stego image and calculate a average ex-
traction error rate of the secret message. We utilize the average
extraction error rate of secret message to evaluate the robust-
ness of schemes.
For security, we conduct experiments on whole 10000 im-
ages of BOSSbase 1.01 [22]. We utilize CCPEV [18] and DCTR
[19] features to extract features of cover and corresponding stego
images. The ensemble classifier is trained with default settings.
6
4.2. Performance of modification with re-compression
In order to verify the effectiveness of modification with re-
compression, we conducted a comparative experiment with Qc =
65. We perform the modification stage 0, 1, 2, 3 times and
named recom 0, recom 1, recom 2, recom 3, correspondingly,
and all the other experiment settings are the same as described
in Section 4.1, steps as shown in Section 3.2. Average extrac-
tion error rates of secret message are shown in Fig.6, we can
see that with the number of modification with re-compression
increase, the average extraction error rates of secret message
gradually decreases. Since when we perform the modification
stage more than twice, improvement in terms of robustness is
not obvious, and further perform the modification stage on the
intermediate image will greatly increase the running time and
risk of being detected. Therefore, we decided to perform the
modification stage twice for each intermediate image.
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Figure 6: Average extraction error rates of after performing 0,1,2,3 times mod-
ification with re-compression
4.3. Performance of constructed embedding domain
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Figure 7: Average extraction error rates of different embedding domain
We try to improve the security of robust steganography with
embedding secret message in lower frequency region. How-
ever, robustness of DCT coefficients in low frequency region is
poor. Fortunately, modification with re-compression can reduce
the error rate of extracted stego sequence, which allows us to
embed a secret message into the lower frequency region. Just
as describe in section 3.1, we only consider lower frequency
embedding domain than GMAS [5]. Therefore, we conducted
a comparative experiment with Qc = 65, we select E 45 as em-
bedding domain at first and expand the embedding domain to
the lower frequency region gradually. All the other experiment
settings are the same as described in Section 4.1, steps as shown
in Section 3.2. In Fig.7, the average extraction error rates of the
secret message are much higher when the embedding domain
is E 345. Yu et al. have proved in [5] that the lower frequency
the embedding domain is, the weaker robustness the cover se-
quence is. Therefore we did not further expand the embedding
domain to lower frequency region. Embedding domain selected
in this paper is E 45.
4.4. Performance of additional check code
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Figure 8: Average extraction error rates of stego sequence with sigle and double
check code
As described in section 3.1, since the check code of E-
DMAS [12] is embedded into the rest lc − le bits sequence with
STCs, which is not robust. To solve such problem, based on
the original framework, we propose an additional check code
which corresponds to step 8 in section 3.2. To verify the per-
formance of additional check code, we conduct an experiment
with Qc = 65, we extract the secret message from stego se-
quence whether the stego sequence embedded with additional
check code. All the other experiment settings are the same as
described in Section 4.1, steps as shown in Section 3.2. We
represent the situation without additional check code as single
check code, otherwise double check code. In Fig.8, the results
demonstrate that additional check code is useful for reducing
average extraction error rate of secret message.
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Figure 9: Average extraction error rates of GMAS[5], E-DMAS[12] and proposed method with channel quality factor 65(left) and 75(right)
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Figure 10: Average detection error rates of GMAS[5], E-DMAS[12] and proposed method with CCPEV(left) and DCTR(right)
4.5. Comparison with E-DMAS and GMAS
In this part, we will compare our scheme with GMAS[5]
and E-DMAS [12] in security and robustness. From the pre-
vious experiments, we can get the final scheme. And we con-
duct experiments with Qc = 65, 75 correspondingly. We extract
the secret message from the stego sequence, the experiment re-
sults are shown in Fig.9. Obviously, our method can achieve
the same and even stronger robustness than E-DMAS [12] and
GMAS[5] when payloads larger than 0.03bpnzac. Although it
performs poorly at low payloads, but not far from the compara-
tive schemes.
As for security, we conduct experiments on the entire Boss-
base 1.01 with Qc = 65. CCPEV [18] and DCTR [19] features
are utilized to extract features of cover and stego images. The
experiment results are shown in the Fig.10. Compared with
E-DMAS [12] and GMAS [5], our scheme greatly improve se-
curity in terms of DCTR features [19]. However, improvement
in resist CCPEV [18] detection ability is not obvious. The ex-
periment results show that when the payloads are larger than
0.03bpnzac, the resist DCTR detection ability is significantly
improved. At low payloads, the security is not far from the
comparative schemes.
5. Conclusion
Nowadays, social networks are more and more widely used
in our lives, which provides the possibility for steganography.
Because of the lossy processing of social networks, such as
JPEG re-compression, the robustness of adaptive steganogra-
phy needs to be improved.
In this paper, we propose a scheme called modification with
re-compression to improve robustness of E-DMAS[12]. And
we move embedding domain to low frequency region to bal-
ance robustness and security. In addition, we add additional
check codes to improve robustness. The experiment results
demonstrate our scheme can achieve higher security and robust-
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ness than comparative schemes when payloads are larger than
0.03bpnzac. The security and robustness are not far from the
comparative papers when the payload is less than 0.03bpnzac.
In the future, we will look for solutions that can improve
security without prior knowledge of channel quality factor. In-
crease embedding capacity is another future work.
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